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SOME SPECIFIC CONCERNS WITH THE 
NEW GENERAL JURISDICTION 
Richard D. Freer* 
INTRODUCTION 
General jurisdiction1 allows a court to enter a judgment against a defendant 
regarding a claim that did not arise in the forum. For generations, no one has 
doubted that such “all-purpose jurisdiction”2 can be based upon a corporation’s 
extensive business activities in the forum.3 Though the verbal formulations 
have differed, the standard phrase has been that general jurisdiction is permis-
sible when the corporate activities in the forum are continuous and systematic.4 
To be sure, courts have reached irreconcilable conclusions concerning where 
the line should be drawn,5 but it has long been unquestioned that at some point 
a corporation’s level of engagement in the forum justifies subjecting it to gen-
eral jurisdiction. 
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown6 and Daimler AG v. 
Bauman,7 the Supreme Court restricted activity-based general jurisdiction over 
corporations. Now, general jurisdiction is proper only where the defendant is 
“at home.”8 The Court does not define “at home” but provides paradigms: a 
                                                        
*  Robert Howell Hall Professor of Law, Emory University. It is a privilege to participate in 
this Symposium honoring Steve Subrin. I am very grateful to Tom Arthur, Stan Cox, Collin 
Freer, Peter Hay, Dan Klerman, Jonathan Nash, Adam Steinman, and Wendy Perdue for 
reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. Claire Jordan, Emory Law class of 
2015, provided valuable research and editorial assistance. 
1  General jurisdiction is to be contrasted with specific jurisdiction, under which the defend-
ant is sued for a claim arising from its activities in or having an effect in the forum. See infra 
note 32 and text accompanying note 37. 
2  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
3  See infra Part I.A. 
4  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011) (discussing purpose-
ful availment). 
5  Compare Bryant v. Finnish Nat’l Airline, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441–42 (N.Y. 1965) (finding 
general jurisdiction over a foreign airline based upon its maintaining a one-and-a-half room 
office in the state and employment of several people at that office), with Follette v. Clairol, 
Inc. 829 F. Supp. 840, 845 (W.D. La. 1993), aff’d mem., 998 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 510 U.S. 1163 (1994) (rejecting general jurisdiction over Wal-Mart despite its opera-
tion of 264 retail stores in Texas). 
6  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852. 
7  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751, 757, 762 (2014). 
8  See infra Part I.A. 
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corporation is “at home” in its state of incorporation and in the state in which it 
has its principal place of business.9 The Court appears to define the latter, how-
ever, as the company’s “nerve center”—that is, the place where decisions are 
made, rather than where the company necessarily engages in business activi-
ties.10 Though the Court conceded in Daimler that there might be cases in 
which general jurisdiction can be based upon the transaction of business, its 
view on this score is extremely parsimonious.11 As a result, activities-based 
general jurisdiction likely has been curtailed significantly. 
Goodyear and Daimler were easy cases. In Goodyear, the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals upheld general jurisdiction over European tire manufacturers 
based on a stream-of-commerce theory.12 In view of the difficulty of using the 
stream of commerce to support even specific jurisdiction (in which the claim 
arises from activities in the forum),13 the holding was obviously questionable. 
Indeed, it is not apparent that any court had previously tried to base general ju-
risdiction on stream-of-commerce contacts.14 In Daimler, the Ninth Circuit up-
held general jurisdiction in California over a German automobile manufacturer 
by attributing to it the California contacts of its American subsidiary.15 These 
attributed contacts, the Ninth Circuit concluded, were sufficient to support ju-
risdiction in California over the German company for claims based upon acts 
by an Argentine subsidiary in Argentina.16 The Court reversed in both cases 
without dissent.17 It soon became apparent, though, that the Court was not in-
terested in using the cases to hone the meaning of “continuous and systematic.” 
It wanted to establish a new and narrower test. 
I do not lament the circumscription of general jurisdiction as such. Maybe 
it is a good thing.18 But the Court’s efforts are puzzling. For one thing, the 
                                                        
9  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. 
10  See infra Part I.B. 
11  See infra Part I.C. 
12  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. Three defendants, subsidiaries of Goodyear USA, manu-
facture tires, respectively, in in France, Luxembourg, and Turkey. Id. at 2850. 
13  See supra note 1. 
14  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2855 (“The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis 
elided the essential difference between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.”). 
15  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751–53 (2014). 
16  Id. Interestingly, then, Goodyear involved jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiary of a 
U.S. parent corporation, while Daimler involved jurisdiction over the foreign parent of a 
U.S. subsidiary. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 750–51. 
17  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850–51; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 750. Justice Ginsburg wrote the 
opinion for the entire Court in Goodyear. In Daimler, her opinion spoke for eight justices, 
with Justice Sotomayor concurring. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 
750. 
18  Indeed, the restriction will lessen the kind of abusive forum shopping permitted in Ferens 
v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). In that case, a Pennsylvania plaintiff sued a manu-
facturing company in tort. Because the statute of limitations had expired in Pennsylvania, he 
sued in federal court in Mississippi, invoking diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. The Mis-
sissippi statute of limitations had not expired. Plaintiff then moved for transfer to federal 
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Court seems unaware that it is upsetting common understandings of general ju-
risdiction. Goodyear and Daimler are notable for what was not litigated. Em-
bedded in each case were closer questions on which the Court’s guidance 
would have been useful. In neither case, however, were the questions asked. In 
Goodyear, the better question was whether Goodyear USA, an Ohio corpora-
tion, should be subject to general jurisdiction in North Carolina. It had three 
manufacturing plants and employs hundreds of people in that state and because 
of these contacts, Goodyear USA assumed that it was amenable to general ju-
risdiction in North Carolina.19 In Daimler, the better question was whether 
Mercedes Benz USA (“MBUSA”), a Delaware entity with its principal place of 
business in New Jersey,20 was subject to general jurisdiction in California. 
MBUSA maintains a regional office and vehicle preparation center in that state, 
and more than 10 percent of Mercedes sales in the United States are realized 
there.21 The German defendant did not question that those contacts would ren-
der MBUSA subject to general jurisdiction in California.22 
After these two decisions, however, it seems clear that Goodyear USA is 
not subject to general jurisdiction in North Carolina, because it is neither incor-
porated nor headquartered there. And MBUSA is not subject to general juris-
diction in California for the same reason. Thus, a jurisdictional basis that was 
                                                                                                                                
court in Pennsylvania, which was granted. Under the doctrine of Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 
U.S. 612, 626–43 (1964), the Mississippi choice of law rules, including the longer statute of 
limitations, transferred with the case. Thus, in Ferens, the Court held that the Mississippi 
statute of limitations applied, which permitted suit to proceed in federal court in Pennsylva-
nia. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 527–32. The maneuver of capturing the statute of limitations of Mis-
sissippi for litigation in Pennsylvania was possible because the manufacturer was subject to 
general jurisdiction in Mississippi. Commentators have noted that restricting general juris-
diction will restrict such forum shopping. See, e.g., Carol Andrews, Another Look at General 
Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1001 (2012); Allan R. Stein, The 
Meaning of “Essentially At Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 528 (2012). 
Such limitation of general jurisdiction would also restrict what Professors Klerman  
and Reilly have described as “forum selling.” Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly,  
Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857. 
19  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850 (“Goodyear USA, which had plants in North Carolina and 
regularly engaged in commercial activity there, did not contest the North Carolina court’s 
jurisdiction over it.”). 
20  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. The Court refers to MBUSA as “a Delaware limited liability 
corporation.” Id. at 752. The reference is ambiguous, because all corporations are “limited 
liability.” Throughout the opinion, the Court treats MBUSA as a corporation. It seems likely, 
however, that MBUSA is a limited liability company, since its name is “Mercedes Benz 
USA, LLC.” Id. at 751. Its status as an LLC would affect the manner in which the entity’s 
citizenship is determined for diversity purposes. The Court did not discuss where a limited 
liability company, partnership, limited partnership, or other non-incorporated business might 
be “at home” for purposes of general jurisdiction. Among business forms, it discussed only 
corporations. Because MBUSA appears to be an LLC, though, perhaps the same analysis 
obtains. 
21  Id. at 752. 
22  Id. at 766 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Daimler conceded at the start of this litigation 
that MBUSA is subject to general jurisdiction based on its California contacts.”). 
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so clearly proper that sophisticated businesses and their lawyers did not ques-
tion it has now become improper.23 Suppose, then, a California citizen is in-
jured in a wreck involving a rented Mercedes automobile in Alaska. She can 
sue MBUSA in Alaska, through specific jurisdiction, and in Delaware and New 
Jersey, through general jurisdiction. But she cannot sue in her home state of 
California. 
Maybe that is the “right” answer but the Court does not tell us why “at 
home” is the proper metric. More puzzlingly, it never tells us why a restriction 
on general jurisdiction is necessary. Given MBUSA’s significant level of activ-
ity in California, why would general jurisdiction there be unfair or even incon-
venient for the defendant? Why don’t the plaintiff’s interest in litigating at 
home and California’s interest in vindicating the claim of one of its citizens 
against a company that is exploiting its market augur in favor of jurisdiction? 
The Court discusses none of this. This lack of rationale reflects the Court’s his-
toric failure to explain the function of general jurisdiction. Because the Court 
has never told us why we have general jurisdiction, it cannot explain why the 
doctrine should be restricted.24 
Part I of this essay traces the Court’s unexplained move from “continuous 
and systematic” to “at home,” including the restrictive paradigms it employs. 
Though the Court concedes in Daimler that general jurisdiction might be based 
upon corporate activities, its characterization of the leading case on point ren-
ders the basis all but unusable. As addressed in Part II, in its rush to limit juris-
diction, the Court decided issues it did not need to decide. Specifically, it con-
cluded that general jurisdiction cannot be based upon sales made in the forum 
and that the assessment of general jurisdiction does not entail consideration of 
whether jurisdiction is fair or reasonable. Thus, such classic fairness factors as 
the plaintiff’s and the forum’s interests are irrelevant in determining whether 
general jurisdiction is proper. Like the overall restriction on general jurisdic-
tion, the Court’s conclusions on these issues may be correct. But their unneces-
sary decision may unduly limit general jurisdiction in the future. 
At the end of the day, as discussed in Part III, maybe my nervousness about 
the evisceration of activities-based general jurisdiction reflects nervousness 
with the current narrow state of specific jurisdiction. Under J. McIntyre Ma-
                                                        
23  Notably, several iconic Supreme Court cases reflect the commonplace of activities-based 
general jurisdiction. For example, everyone assumed that Oklahoma had general jurisdiction 
over Audi and Volkswagen of North America in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980). Similarly, in its seminal decision on choice-of-law, Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, the Court assumed that the insurance company’s activities rendered it amenable to 
general jurisdiction in the forum. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 (1981). An-
other example is Ferens, 494 U.S. 516, discussed supra note 18, in which the defendant 
made no effort to contest the exercise of general jurisdiction over it in Mississippi. 
24  For a full discussion, see Stanley E. Cox, The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 
U. PITT. L. REV. 153, 162–68 (2014). 
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chinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,25 specific jurisdiction is problematic. In such times, 
general jurisdiction based upon substantial corporate activities stands as a back-
stop, a gap-filler, to ensure access to justice. It seems odd to be restricting gen-
eral jurisdiction in an era in which specific jurisdiction is not pulling its share 
of the load. 
I. THE “AT HOME” APPROACH 
A. Its Unexplained Adoption 
Before Goodyear and Daimler, the general jurisdiction canon was that a 
corporate defendant could be sued on a claim not arising in the forum if the de-
fendant engaged in “continuous and systematic” activities in the forum.26 The 
phrase is found in International Shoe Company v. Washington.27 In the four 
decades after International Shoe, the Court expressly addressed general juris-
diction only twice. In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company,28 it 
held that a mining corporation that suspended operations in the Philippines dur-
ing World War II was subject to general jurisdiction in the state in which its 
president conducted general corporate activities.29 In Helicopteros Nacionales 
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, it held that a Colombian charter air transportation 
service was not subject to general jurisdiction in the state in which it bought 
helicopters and spare parts and where its pilots were trained.30 The Court found 
the contacts insufficient in part because it relied upon a 1923 decision, Rosen-
berg Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Curtis Brown Co.31 That case had held, twenty two 
years before International Shoe, that “purchases and related trips, standing 
alone” cannot justify general jurisdiction.32 
                                                        
25  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790–91 (2011) (rejecting specific 
jurisdiction); see infra text accompanying notes 94–99. 
26  See PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 404–05 (5th ed. 2010). 
27  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). In fact, the Court in Internation-
al Shoe used “continuous and systematic” when discussing an instance of specific jurisdic-
tion. See id. at 317. Later in the opinion, it spoke of defendants with “continuous corporate 
operations [that are] so substantial” as to justify general jurisdiction. Id. at 318. For some 
reason, courts rather consistently have used the “continuous and systematic” phrase in refer-
ring to general jurisdiction. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 767 n.6 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). For 
example, in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952), the 
Court based its holding on the defendant’s “continuous and systematic” business in Ohio. 
See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–16 (1984) 
(general jurisdiction based upon “continuous and systematic general business contacts”). 
28  Perkins, 342 U.S. 437. 
29  Id. at 447–48. 
30  Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409, 418. 
31  Id. at 417. (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 
(1923)). 
32  Id. (citing Rosenberg, 260 U.S. 516). In his dissent, Justice Brennan strongly criticized 
the Court’s reliance on pre-International Shoe authority. Id. at 421 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
It seems that Rosenberg was decided before the terms “general” and “specific” jurisdiction 
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Perkins and Helicopteros presented nearly polar opposites on the scale of 
business activity in the forum—one clearly “continuous and systematic” and 
one not.33 Through the decades, lower courts wrestled with individual cases 
that presented much closer questions, without guidance from the Court. Coun-
sel developed a sense of when a client would be subject to general jurisdiction 
and when the client should challenge an assertion. Now, with Goodyear and 
Daimler, the Court has shifted the focus from “continuous and systematic” ac-
tivities in the forum to whether the defendant is “at home” in the forum.34 That 
phrase had not found currency in the lower courts. There was no clamor in the 
lower courts to adopt “at home” as the proper standard for general jurisdiction. 
In fact, it is not clear that a single state court had ever employed “at home” as a 
proxy for general jurisdiction.35 Yet “at home” is now a constitutional stand-
ard.36 
All exercises of personal jurisdiction raise questions of political legitimacy. 
With specific jurisdiction, the forum seeks to determine liability concerning 
acts that occurred (or had an effect) within it. With general jurisdiction, the fo-
rum is exercising adjudicatory power not over conduct, but over the defendant 
itself; by definition, the conduct in suit took place elsewhere.37 What gives a 
state the authority to regulate a non-local defendant in this way? The Court 
concludes that a defendant’s being “at home” in the state justifies the exercise. 
But why? There is a robust literature on the political legitimacy of personal ju-
risdiction.38 The Court does not engage it, and does little more than decree that 
“at home” is the proxy for the task.39 
                                                                                                                                
were part of the common parlance. The dichotomy appears to trace its origin to 1966. Arthur 
T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136–45 (1966). 
33  HAY ET AL., supra note 26, at 372 (“Each [case] stands towards one end of a long spec-
trum of corporate affiliations with the state.”). 
34  Initially in Goodyear, the Court used “essentially at home.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Op-
erations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). Later in the opinion, however, the 
Court dropped “essentially” and referred twice to “at home.” Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854, 
2857. In Daimler, all references are to “at home”; the modifier “essentially” never appears. 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
35  A Lexis search on September 1, 2014 found that no state-court case had used the phrase 
“at home” within 18 words of “general jurisdiction” in a personal jurisdiction case before 
2011. In contrast, 891 state-court cases had used the phrase “continuous and systematic” 
within 18 words of “general jurisdiction” in such cases. 
36  The Court took the phrase “at home” and the paradigms from Lea Brilmayer et al., A 
General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 728 (1988). See Daimler, 134 S. 
Ct. at 760. 
37  HAY ET AL., supra note 26, at 370 (It is “jurisdiction without regard to the character of the 
dispute”). 
38  See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1296–
97 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court 
Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 84–86; Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and 
Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1551, 1554 (2012); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal 
Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REV. 529, 534–46 (1991); Todd David Pe-
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B. The Restrictive Paradigms 
The Court did not define “at home,” but provided paradigms for the con-
cept. For a natural person, the paradigm is her domicile.40 In fact, however, 
many people (military personnel and students, for instance) live in states other 
than their domicile.41 It may well be proper to exercise general jurisdiction at 
their domiciles, but not because the defendant is in any sense “at home” there. 
More broadly, because a human has only one domicile, the Court’s adop-
tion of domicile as its paradigm implies that a person can only be “at home” in 
one place. This conclusion ignores the fact that historically courts have exer-
cised general jurisdiction over natural persons where they are served with pro-
cess. Indeed, in terms of pedigree, presence when served would seem to rival 
domicile as a paradigm for general jurisdiction.42 Yet the Court does not men-
tion presence. It thus does not face the striking juxtaposition between the result 
in Goodyear and the result in Burnham v. Superior Court.43 In the latter case, 
all nine justices upheld general jurisdiction in California over an individual 
who had been served with process in that state.44 The result is jarring: Good-
                                                                                                                                
terson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 101–02 (2010); 
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 
82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 639 (2007); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federal-
ism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 690–92 (1987); Allen R. Stein, 
Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory 
Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 412–14 (2004); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Com-
mon Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 850 (1989). 
39  The Court appears simply to agree with the position of Professor Brilmayer that general 
jurisdiction should be limited to where the defendant is “at home.” Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 
2853–54; Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; Brilmayer supra note 36, at 727–35. For a criticism of 
the Court’s interpretation in Goodyear of cases cited in International Shoe, see Thomas C. 
Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful What You Wish For: Goodyear, Daimler, and the 
Evisceration of General Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2001, 2001, 2007–14 (2014). 
40  See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the ex-
ercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile . . . .”). 
41  A good example is Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th Cir. 1974), which is a staple in Civil 
Procedure casebooks. There, one of the plaintiffs was born and raised in Mississippi. Upon 
reaching adulthood, she moved to Louisiana, where she lived for several years to attend 
school. She also lived in Illinois, where she continued her schooling before returning to Lou-
isiana. All this time, the court concluded, she remained a domiciliary of Mississippi. Id. at 
1400. It is questionable, however, that she would have considered herself “at home” in Mis-
sissippi. 
42  General jurisdiction based both upon domicile (“residence”) and service of process in the 
forum were well-established by the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1878). 
43  Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990). Though the case generated 
no majority rationale, all nine justices concluded that California had general jurisdiction over 
the defendant. Id. at 607. 
44  Four justices reasoned that the historical pedigree of jurisdiction based upon service of 
process in the forum justified the conclusion. Id. at 619. Four others asserted that general 
jurisdiction was proper under International Shoe. Id. at 628–30. The ninth concurred with 
the result. Id. at 640. See also RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 104–06 (3d ed. 2012) 
(discussing the separate opinions). 
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year USA can operate three manufacturing plants year-round in North Carolina 
but apparently cannot be sued there on a claim arising in South Carolina,45 
while Mr. Burnham, who visited California for four days, can be sued there on 
a claim that arose anywhere in the world.46 The Court gives no hint about why 
general jurisdiction over corporations should be so much narrower than it is 
over humans. 
Even if we accept a natural person’s domicile as the paradigm for general 
jurisdiction, how does that concept translate to corporations? In Goodyear and 
Daimler, the Court concluded that two places are the “equivalent” of domicile 
for a corporation: the state of incorporation and the state of principal place of 
business.47 
But a corporation’s state of incorporation is nothing like a human’s domi-
cile. Artificial persons have no rights—indeed, they have no existence—
without imprimatur from a state. Moreover, the law of the state of incorporation 
governs the internal affairs of the corporation, even if the company does no 
business in that state.48 This regulatory power, plus the raw fact that the state 
granted the entity its existence, supports the conclusion that the state of incor-
poration must have general jurisdiction over corporations formed there. In con-
trast, states neither create people nor imbue them with powers. General juris-
diction in the state of incorporation is undoubtedly appropriate, but not based 
upon an analogy to domicile. Instead, the closer analogy is to jurisdiction based 
upon consent, because the proprietors chose to form the business there. 
A corporation’s principal place of business might come closer to approxi-
mating the human domicile. A person establishes her domicile by doing two 
things: (1) physically going to the state, and (2) forming the subjective intent to 
remain there indefinitely (that is, to make it her true, fixed location).49 As Pro-
fessor Stein says, domicile is “about perceiving, and having others perceive me 
as a member of their community.”50 Corporations are inanimate, so it is diffi-
                                                        
45  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850–51. 
46  Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608, 619. Concurring in Daimler, Justice Sotomayor uses the jux-
taposition to support her assertion that the majority is too parsimonious with general jurisdic-
tion over corporations. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772–73 (2014) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring). Regardless of one’s reaction to Goodyear and Daimler, one consequence of 
the cases may be to put greater pressure on the continued existence of general jurisdiction 
based upon service of process in the forum. 
47  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. On the other hand, later in 
the Daimler opinion, the Court replaced the “and” with an “or” in saying that Goodyear did 
not limit general jurisdiction only to “a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal 
place of business.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. Later still, it speaks of exceptional cases in 
which general jurisdiction is proper in places “other than [the corporation’s] formal place of 
incorporation or principal place of business.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19 (emphasis 
added). 
48  Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982). 
49  FREER, supra note 44, at 179. 
50  Stein, supra note 18, at 543. 
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cult to talk about their “perceiving” whether they belong in a given community. 
But corporations do take actions, and at some point those actions may manifest 
that the business has joined the community in a way approximating domicile. 
Indeed, in most cases involving human domicile, an analysis of activities is 
required. Most people do not wake up one morning and say: “I have formed the 
intent to make this my permanent home.” So courts must judge intent from ac-
tions. A person takes a job in the state; earns a promotion; buys a house; regis-
ters to vote; joins a church, civic organizations, and clubs; etc. At some point a 
court can say that she has formed the intent to make that state her domicile. So 
too a corporation might buy a business facility, hire employees, engage agents, 
join trade associations, and the like. At some point, activities such as these jus-
tify the conclusion that the company is part of the community—that it is “at 
home.” 
But such an activities-based “principal place of business” is not what the 
Court has in mind. In Daimler, the Court cited Hertz Corp. v. Friend51 when it 
noted the principal place of business as a paradigm.52 Hertz defined principal 
place of business for purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. It adopted 
the “nerve center” test, which focuses on where managers “direct, control, and 
coordinate the corporation’s activities.”53 The nerve center is usually the corpo-
ration’s headquarters.54 It is important to remember, though, that Hertz inter-
preted “principal place of business” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).55 In that 
statute, the phrase is preceded by the word “the,” which commands that there 
be only one such place.56 In the personal jurisdiction context, it is not apparent 
that (1) there can be only one principal place of business, or (2) that it must be 
the nerve center rather than a place of activities.57 
How we define principal place of business should depend on why we have 
general jurisdiction in the first place. One possibility is that we want to reassure 
plaintiffs that there is always a place (or places) where a defendant can be sued. 
Specific jurisdiction can be problematic, so we want to reassure plaintiffs that 
                                                        
51  Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
52  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
53  Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93. 
54  Id. at 81 (“We believe that the ‘nerve center’ will typically be found at a corporation’s 
headquarters.”). Before Hertz, courts had disagreed on whether the principal place of busi-
ness was the nerve center or place of major activities. Indeed, that is the reason the Court 
granted certiorari in Hertz. Id. at 80, 91 (“We seek here to resolve different interpretations 
that the Circuits have given this phrase. . . . The number of factors grew as courts explicitly 
combined aspects of the ‘nerve center’ and ‘business activity’ tests to look to a corporation’s 
‘total activities,’ sometimes to try to determine what treatises have described as the corpora-
tion’s ‘center of gravity’.”). 
55  See id. 
56  28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2010) (prescribing citizenship to “the” state or foreign country in 
which the corporation has its principal place of business); see Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93 (“A cor-
poration’s ‘nerve center,’ usually its main headquarters, is a single place.”). 
57  FREER, supra note 44, at 183–85. 
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they can bring a defendant to justice at a certain place (or places). If this pre-
dictability is the rationale, the nerve center is as good a test as any. Another 
possibility, however, which is consistent with concern over the political legiti-
macy of exercising jurisdiction, is that general jurisdiction is proper only when 
the defendant is an “insider”—when its affiliation with the state justifies coer-
cion.58 If this is the rationale, the corporation’s activities in the forum seem to 
be the more appropriate metric. 
The Court failed to address the theoretical basis for general jurisdiction. In-
stead, it appears to justify the choice of nerve center in terms of convenience: it 
is easy to apply.59 But this is not always so, as it appears increasingly common 
to divide corporate oversight functions among different locations.60 Moreover, 
substantively, the nerve center is not analogous to human domicile. Corpora-
tions can separate “mind” from “body”—the board of directors in State A can 
command actions in State B. If principal place of business has any reasonable 
analog to human domicile, it is where the corporation does things, not where it 
decides to do things. Why would a corporation be more “at home” where its 
board of directors meets61 than where it interacts with a community—that is, 
where it hires and fires, holds employee Fourth of July picnics, sponsors youth 
sports teams, joins civic associations, and contributes to charities?62 
Might a corporation be “at home” in a state other than its state of charter 
and the state of its nerve center? Though the Court was less than clear on this 
point in Goodyear,63 in Daimler it said yes, explaining that a corporation may 
                                                        
58  Professor Brilmayer makes this point in the article cited by the Court. See Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). Professor Stein argues that the non-local defendant 
must be so connected with the forum that the court’s ruling against it would not be seen as an 
externality; in other words, the court’s ruling against that defendant would be seen as some-
thing that could hurt the forum. Stein, supra note 18, at 543–44. The Court fails to discuss 
why it concludes that Professor Brilmayer’s metric for this assessment—“at home”—is the 
right one. 
59  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (characterizing places of incorporation and principal place of 
business as “easily ascertainable”). 
60  See id. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
61  As will be discussed in Part II, general jurisdiction cannot be based upon purchases or 
sales in the forum. 
62  Many corporations have their nerve center and activities in only one state. But the type of 
corporation on which general jurisdiction discussion centers—the Wal-Marts, Coca-Colas, 
Proctor & Gambles, Amazons, and the like—feature activities in various states other than 
that from which managers direct corporate activities. 
63  Some commentators concluded after Goodyear and before Daimler that the Court had 
limited general jurisdiction to states of incorporation and principal place of business. See, 
e.g., Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdic-
tion, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 694 (2012); see also Stein, supra note 18, at 527–28. Others urged 
that Goodyear precluded general jurisdiction in a broader range of states. See, e.g., Peterson, 
supra note 38, at 213–17. 
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also be “at home” based upon activities in a state.64 The Court was emphatic, 
however, that such activities-based cases will be “exceptional.”65 Indeed, as we 
now address, it is difficult to imagine cases in which such exceptional circum-
stances will provide plaintiffs with a true option for general jurisdiction.66 
C. Activities-Based General Jurisdiction 
Though confirming that general jurisdiction may be based upon activities 
in the forum, the Court in Daimler implied that only one state may fill that bill. 
The implication arises from the Court’s instruction that a defendant’s contacts 
with the forum are assessed holistically, in the context of its overall business.67 
It is not enough that the company engages in a level of activity in-state that is 
comparable to that of a local business.68 “General jurisdiction instead calls for 
an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and 
worldwide.”69 
Assume that the largest business formed in State A engages in activity in-
state that can be quantified as level 100; further, most State A businesses en-
gage in activity there quantified as level 50. Suppose a large interstate corpora-
tion engages in activity in State A at level 125. In relation to the business com-
munity in State A, the interstate corporation is the most significant player. To 
the Court, that fact is irrelevant. Instead, we would need to know how this 
quantum of activity compares to the interstate corporation’s entire business. If 
the activity in State A constitutes but a small percentage of the interstate corpo-
ration’s overall business, general jurisdiction would improperly allow State A 
to have regulatory authority over the far greater quantum of activity out of 
                                                        
64  “Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a 
forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those 
places paradigm all-purpose forums.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 
65  “We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, a corporation’s opera-
tions in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business 
may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” 
Id. at 761 n.19 (citation omitted). 
66  In Daimler, the Court granted certiorari on whether the California contacts of MBUSA 
can be imputed to Daimler, a German company, so as to find general jurisdiction over Daim-
ler. See id. at 751. The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s attribution of contacts, which was 
based on principles of agency and control. Id. at 753–54, 759–60. But it did not define the 
scope of attribution. See id. at 759. Ultimately, it concluded, even with attribution of 
MBUSA’s contacts, Daimler was not “at home” in California. Id. at 751, 760. Because the 
Court did not answer the question on which it granted review, we now have an interesting 
question: suppose a plaintiff sues Daimler in Delaware or New Jersey, basing general juris-
diction on the fact that the subsidiary is “at home” there. Does that make Daimler “at home” 
there? 
67  See id. at 762 n.20. 
68  See id. 
69  Id. 
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state.70 Clearly, this “proportionality” assessment71 leads to the conclusion that 
activities-based general jurisdiction can be proper, if ever, in only one state. 
In her concurrence in Daimler, Justice Sotomayor disagrees sharply on this 
point. To her, the focus should be the defendant’s level of activities in the fo-
rum, to see if its contacts are “akin to those of a local enterprise that actually is 
‘at home’ in the State.”72 Thus, if the interstate corporation engaged in State A 
in a quantum of business, say, at level 75 or perhaps even 50, it would be sub-
ject to general jurisdiction there.73 This focus would allow a court to conclude 
that a given corporation is “at home” in several states.74 
The debate raises an interesting question: from whose vantage point is “at 
home” to be assessed? The proportionality test makes sense if the question is 
what the company likely considers its home. If its activities in the forum, 
though comparable to local businesses, are dwarfed by its activities elsewhere, 
the company is unlikely to consider itself “at home” there. After all, to the 
business, the forum is only a way station, an outpost. Justice Ginsburg’s opin-
ion for the Court reflects this view.75 But what if the assessment is to be made 
in the eyes of the community? The corporation may employ as many people 
and stimulate the economy as much as the largest local business. In such a case, 
the community might consider the corporation to be “at home.” Justice So-
tomayor’s concurrence reflects this view.76 
If we concede that activities-based general jurisdiction is proper in only 
one state (beyond the state of incorporation and the state of the nerve center), 
how much activity must there be to render a corporation “at home?” In Good-
year, the Court considered Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Company77 
to be the “textbook case” for general jurisdiction over a corporation.78 In Daim-
ler, it cited Perkins as the example of the type of “exceptional case” in which 
                                                        
70  See id. For this point, the Court relies upon an argument set forth in Feder, supra note 63, 
at 694. Mr. Feder represented the defendants in Goodyear. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera-
tions, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011). 
71  Justice Sotomayor uses this handy label; the Court does not. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
72  Id. at 769. 
73  “The problem, the Court says, is not that Daimler’s contacts with California are too few, 
but that its contacts with other forums are too many.” Id. at 764. 
74  Id. at 770 (“[T]here is nothing unpredictable about a rule that instructs multinational cor-
porations that if they engage in continuous and substantial contacts with more than one State, 
they will be subject to general jurisdiction in each one.”). The majority responds by saying 
that Justice Sotomayor’s test sanctions general jurisdiction based upon “doing business,” 
which the Court clearly intends to reject (or substantially restrict). Id. at 762 n.20 (majority 
opinion) (“Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing business’ tests framed 
before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States.”). 
75  See id. at 750–63. 
76  See id. at 763–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
77  Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
78  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011) (quot-
ing Donahue v. Far Eastern Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
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general jurisdiction can be based upon business activities.79 Justice Ginsburg 
characterizes the facts of Perkins, however, in a way that minimizes the impact 
of the case. Specifically, she concludes that Perkins supports general jurisdic-
tion when “all” of a company’s business is conducted in a single state. In fact, 
however, the corporation over which Ohio properly exercised general jurisdic-
tion did not conduct “all” business in that state. In Perkins, the plaintiff, “a non-
resident of Ohio,” sued the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company in Ohio to 
recover dividends and damages for the company’s alleged failure to issue stock 
certificates to her.80 The corporation was formed “under the laws of the Philip-
pine Islands,” where it owned and operated gold and silver mines.81 The com-
pany suspended mining operations when the Japanese occupied the Philippines 
in World War II.82 During the interregnum, the corporate president, “who was 
also the general manager and principal stockholder,” returned to his home in 
Ohio.83 Justice Ginsburg described the corporate activity in Ohio by saying that 
“[a]ll of Benguet’s activities were directed by the company’s president from 
within Ohio.”84 
That statement might not be accurate. The Court’s opinion in Perkins never 
said that “all” corporate activities were directed from Ohio. Rather, it said that 
the president “did many things on behalf of the company”85 in Ohio. Justice So-
tomayor recounted the facts from the opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals.86 
By the time the case was filed, she says, Benguet had resumed mining in the 
Philippines and had a robust corporate presence in California, from which it 
negotiated the purchase of supplies as directed from the chief of staff in Ma-
nila.87 The board of directors had met in Ohio, but had also met outside that 
state.88 Thus, Justice Sotomayor concludes, the fact that the Court nonetheless 
upheld general jurisdiction in Ohio supports the conclusion that systematic and 
continuous activities—short of “all” activities—can support general jurisdic-
tion. 
                                                        
79  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19. 
80  Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438–39. 
81  Id. at 439. 
82  Id. at 447. 
83  Id. 
84  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 n.8. Though Perkins is considered an example of activities-
based general jurisdiction, this sentence is consistent with the conclusion that the corpora-
tion’s nerve center was in Ohio. 
85  Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448. 
86  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 769 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
87  Id. 
88  Id. (“[T]he facts of the case set forth by the Ohio Court of Appeals show just how ‘lim-
ited’ the company’s Ohio contacts—which included a single officer keeping files and man-
aging affairs from his Ohio home office—were in comparison with its ‘general business’ 
operations elsewhere.”). 
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Nonetheless, the Court’s inference in Daimler is that general jurisdiction is 
proper only if “all” corporate activities are in one state. The type of corporation 
that does “all” business in one state will almost always be incorporated or have 
its headquarters in the same state (or both). With such localized businesses, ac-
tivities-based general jurisdiction will add nothing at all; the activities state al-
ready had general jurisdiction because of incorporation or having its nerve cen-
ter there. By definition, requiring that “all” activities be in a single state means 
that activities-based general jurisdiction will not be available for interstate 
businesses like Goodyear USA or MBUSA.89 With such companies, general 
jurisdiction will be restricted to where they are incorporated and where they 
have their nerve centers. 
To this point, then, the Court has limited general jurisdiction by adopting 
“at home” as the proper test, by choosing limited examples of what constitutes 
“at home,” and by placing the bar for activities-based general jurisdiction too 
high to do any good in most cases. Beyond this, the Court may have hampered 
future expansion by deciding issues that were not presented by the parties. 
II. UNNECESSARY DECISIONS 
In addition to introducing the “at home” test for general jurisdiction, the 
Court in Goodyear established what appear to be two absolute rules. First, gen-
eral jurisdiction cannot be based upon a stream-of-commerce rationale.90 This 
issue was squarely presented by the case and the Court’s decision is plainly 
correct. The stream of commerce introduces a defendant’s products into the fo-
rum indirectly. The classic example involves components: the defendant manu-
factures a component in State A. The defendant sells the component to a com-
pany in State B, which puts the part into its finished product. The State B 
company then sells the finished product into States C, D, and E. The compo-
nent manufacturer’s part thus gets into States C, D, and E, albeit indirectly, 
through the act of the State B manufacturer. The Court has failed twice to de-
termine whether the stream of commerce can constitute a relevant contact be-
tween a manufacturer and States C, D, and E for purposes of specific jurisdic-
tion.91 Perforce, then, such a contact cannot constitute the greater affiliation 
necessary for general jurisdiction. 
                                                        
89  A company that does business in multiple states, like Goodyear USA and MBUSA, obvi-
ously cannot do “all” of its business in one state. The Court’s characterization of Perkins as 
requiring that “all” business be done in one state, then, renders activities-based general juris-
diction impossible for large companies. See supra note 62. 
90  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (holding that a stream-of-commerce rationale is “[a] con-
nection so limited between the forum and the foreign corporation . . . [it] is an inadequate 
basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”). 
91  The cases were J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) and Asahi 
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). In neither case could the 
Court muster more than four adherents to a position, even though McIntyre presented the 
easier fact pattern of marketing a finished product, rather than components. McIntyre, 480 
U.S. at 2783, 2786; Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102–04. 
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In addition, however, the Court in Goodyear went beyond the stream-of-
commerce scenario to rule out general jurisdiction based upon any sales into 
the forum. This was an issue it did not need to address. For this point, the Court 
quoted that portion of Helicopteros that relied on Rosenberg.92 In Rosenberg, 
the Court held that a company that purchased its inventory in the forum, and 
whose agents made related trips to the forum, could not be sued there on a 
claim arising elsewhere.93 In other words, a defendant’s buying from the forum 
cannot support general jurisdiction. In Goodyear, the Court extended Rosen-
berg to a company’s selling into the forum.94 Thus, neither buying from nor 
selling into a forum can render a corporation “at home” there. Putting aside the 
appropriateness of extending pre-International Shoe authority such as Rosen-
berg,95 is there not an argument that buying and selling might have different 
jurisdictional consequences? A company that buys products from a forum does 
not endanger forum residents (except the seller, who runs the risk of not being 
paid). In contrast, a company that sells products into a forum exposes residents 
to the products. If the products are faulty, any number of forum residents might 
be harmed.96 
Might that state not have a legitimate regulatory interest concerning such a 
defendant? Foreclosing the issue may have an undesirable impact when (and if) 
the Court addresses jurisdiction based upon Internet activity. If general jurisdic-
tion cannot be based upon the defendant’s buying or selling in the forum, retail 
marketers such as Amazon and L.L. Bean cannot be subject to general jurisdic-
tion, say, in California, regardless of the volume of sales or number of products 
shipped into the state.97 Maybe that is as it should be, but it would seem pru-
dent to decide the question only when it is presented, briefed, and argued. 
                                                        
92  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 
U.S. 408, 415–18 (1984)). 
93  Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923). 
94  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (explaining that “the sales of petitioners’ tires sporadically 
made in North Carolina through intermediaries” were insufficient ties and therefore did not 
warrant general jurisdiction). 
95  In Daimler, the plaintiffs relied upon two cases cited by the Court in Perkins for the 
proposition that general jurisdiction may be based upon a corporation’s doing business (as 
indicated by the presence of a local office). Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.18 
(2014). In that instance, the age of the authority mattered to Justice Ginsburg, who said: 
“Perkins’ unadorned citations to these cases, both decided in the era dominated by Pennoy-
er’s territorial thinking, should not attract heavy reliance today.” Id. (citation omitted). Why 
Rosenberg should command obeisance today is hard to divine and Justice Ginsburg did not 
explain the different treatment. 
96  To be sure, a plaintiff harmed by a product in the state could invoke specific jurisdiction 
over the defendant. The question is whether there might be a state regulatory interest over 
the seller that would justify general jurisdiction. 
97  Over a decade ago, a Ninth Circuit panel upheld general jurisdiction over L.L. Bean 
based upon sales volume into California. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 
1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003). The opinion was vacated to allow the Circuit to hear it en banc, 
366 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2004), and thereafter dismissed as moot because the parties settled, 
398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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The rule against basing general jurisdiction on purchases or sales implies 
that general jurisdiction requires the defendant’s presence in the forum in a 
bricks-and-mortar sense.98 If so, the Court appears to be saying that general ju-
risdiction has something to do with the defendant’s physical engagement with 
the community of the forum. But, as we saw above, when it came to selecting a 
“paradigm” for general jurisdiction, the Court adopted not a place of activities, 
but the place where corporate decisions are made.99 
In Daimler, the Court made a surprising pronouncement about the constitu-
tional assessment of general jurisdiction. Once a court determines that the de-
fendant is “at home,” the assessment is complete. The court does not consider 
whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be fair or reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. The conclusion was surprising because no party argued or briefed 
the issue.100 Moreover, it was apparently contrary to the uniform holdings of 
the courts of appeals on the issue.101 The Court announced its conclusion in a 
footnote, explaining that in cases of general jurisdiction, “any second-step in-
quiry would be superfluous.”102 After all, how can someone argue that litiga-
tion is not convenient where he is “at home?”103 
The conclusion is surprising, at least coming from Justice Ginsburg, be-
cause it admits that fairness factors cannot be used to support a finding of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The point requires a bit of background. There have been two 
general schools of thought on how courts are to apply International Shoe. 
One—pioneered by Justice Black104 and championed by Justice Brennan—may 
be called the “mélange” approach.105 Under that view, all relevant factors—
                                                        
98  HAY ET AL., supra note 26, at 373 (summarizing pre-Goodyear case law: “An important 
factor in whether a corporation . . . will be subjected to [general] jurisdiction is a continuing 
physical presence in the forum, usually in the form of an office or employees.”). 
99  See supra Part I.A. 
100  Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Court had not previously addressed the issue and 
that it had not been briefed by the parties. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring). 
101  Justice Sotomayor wrote that the courts of appeals “have uniformly held that the reason-
ableness prong does in fact apply in the general jurisdiction context.” Id. at 764 n.1. 
102  Id. at 762 n.20 (majority opinion) (“Then, in a second step, the court is to consider sev-
eral additional factors to assess the reasonableness of entertaining the case.”). 
103  On the other hand, people who do not live in their state of domicile might contest the 
fairness of suing them there. See supra note 41 (discussing Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396 (5th 
Cir. 1974), in which a plaintiff had not resided in her state of domicile for several years). The 
argument that general jurisdiction in one’s state of domicile might be unfair on such facts 
now appears to be foreclosed. 
104  In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), the Court, per 
Justice Black, upheld specific jurisdiction based upon one contact with the forum, emphasiz-
ing, inter alia, the forum’s interest, the plaintiff’s interest in litigating at home, and the rela-
tive burdens on the parties. Such mixing of “contact” and “fairness” elements in one overall 
assessment is typical of the mélange approach noted infra in text accompanying notes 105–
06; see also Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 646–48 (1950). 
105  Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy 
of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 554–69 (2012) (discussing Justice Brennan’s efforts 
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including defendant’s contacts with the forum and such fairness factors as the 
plaintiff’s interest, the forum’s interest, and burden on the defendant—are 
weighed together in one unstructured assessment. Under this view, considera-
tions of fairness might offset the fact that the defendant had a marginal contact 
with the forum and therefore support jurisdiction.106 The other school ap-
proaches the matter in two rigid steps: first, there must be a relevant contact, 
after which the court may consider factors of reasonableness.107 Under this ap-
proach, the fairness factors might defeat jurisdiction; that is, the court might 
conclude that though the defendant established a purposeful contact, the exer-
cise of jurisdiction would not be fair.108 
Until her opinion for the Court in Daimler, Justice Ginsburg appeared to be 
a devotee of the mélange approach. Her dissent in McIntyre excoriated the 
Court for making far too much of the contact analysis and giving short shrift to 
fairness factors that would support jurisdiction.109 Though McIntyre was a spe-
cific jurisdiction case, Justice Ginsburg’s willingness to jettison a fairness anal-
ysis in general jurisdiction appears to signal her embrace of the rigid two-step 
formulation for applying International Shoe. Later in the same footnote, in fact, 
she states plainly that in specific jurisdiction cases the court must find a rele-
vant contact before assessment of fairness becomes relevant.110 
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor asserts that both the contact and 
fairness prongs of the International Shoe analysis apply in general jurisdic-
                                                                                                                                
to promote use of an approach that mixes factors relating to contact and factors relating to 
fairness in an unstructured way). 
106  In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), Justice Brennan wrote his only 
majority opinion in a personal jurisdiction case. There, he attempted to collapse the contact 
and fairness prongs of analysis under International Shoe by using a sliding-scale concept. Id. 
at 477. Specifically, he said that fairness factors “sometimes serve to establish the reasona-
bleness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be 
required.” Id. 
107  This rigid two-step approach—under which a finding of contact is necessary before fac-
tors relating to fairness or reasonableness become relevant—is exemplified by World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 291–94 (1980). 
108  The only time the Supreme Court has upheld dismissal based upon fairness factors was 
in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113–15 (1987). As Pro-
fessor Hay has demonstrated, the dismissal in Asahi was essentially an invocation of the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens. Peter Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over Interna-
tional Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 593, 601 n.65. The same may be said of Daimler because, in both cases, the 
claimants and defendants were non-American citizens and the claim arose overseas. Daimler 
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014); Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106. 
109  See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2798–801 (2011) (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting). I believe that Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in McIntyre is an example of the mé-
lange approach. I am aware that others disagree. In view of her adoption of the two-step ap-
proach in Daimler, perhaps I was am wrong. 
110  Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (“First, a court is to determine whether the connection 
between the forum and the episode-in-suit could justify the exercise of specific jurisdiction. 
Then, in a second step, the court is to consider several additional factors to assess the reason-
ableness of entertaining the case.”). 
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tion.111 She would apply the fairness factors to reject jurisdiction. Daimler, she 
explains, is like Asahi, in which the parties are all non-U.S. citizens and the suit 
concerns claims arising overseas.112 Thus, in the “unique circumstances of this 
case,” jurisdiction would be unreasonable.113 
The question is not whether fairness factors should be available to defeat 
jurisdiction. They always have been. The question is whether considerations of 
fair play and substantial justice might support jurisdiction based upon a rela-
tively low showing of contact between the defendant and the forum. After 
Daimler, the answer—certainly for general jurisdiction and apparently in spe-
cific jurisdiction as well—is no. This limitation may prove regrettable, at least 
in our present era, which features such a parsimonious view of specific jurisdic-
tion. 
III. THE PERILS OF RESTRICTING GENERAL JURISDICTION 
Goodyear and Daimler are puzzling because they impose restrictions that 
the Court feels no need to justify. They may be harmful, however, because they 
come at a time when specific jurisdiction is not as robust as many think it 
should be.114 The main cause, of course, is the Court’s 2011 decision in McIn-
tyre.115 In that case, Mr. Nicastro, a citizen of New Jersey, was severely injured 
at work while using a machine manufactured in England.116 The manufacturer 
sold its machines to a company in Ohio, which then sold them to businesses 
throughout the United States.117 One machine was sold to Mr. Nicastro’s em-
ployer. Mr. Nicastro sued the British manufacturer in New Jersey, and asserted 
a product liability claim.118 The Court held that New Jersey did not have specif-
ic jurisdiction over the British manufacturer.119 
What option would Mr. Nicastro have now? The only other option for liti-
gation in the United States would be to sue McIntyre in Ohio. One potential 
problem, however, is that Mr. Nicastro suffered his injury in New Jersey. Con-
                                                        
111  Justice Sotomayor asserted: “[W]e have never required that prong [contact] to be decid-
ed first.” Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 765 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The statement seems 
belied by World-Wide Volkswagen and Burger King. And, as noted in the preceding foot-
note, even Justice Ginsburg has adopted the two-step methodology. 
112  Id. at 765. 
113  Id. at 763. 
114  See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of 
the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1263–75 (2011); Arthur R. Miller, 
McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465, 475–78 (2012); 
Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 41, 59–
83 (2012). 
115  J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
116  Id. at 2786. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. at 2785, 2791. 
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ceivably, then, an Ohio court might conclude that the claim did not arise in the 
forum. The case points out another hole in the jurisprudence of minimum con-
tacts: how related must a contact be to forum activities to support specific ju-
risdiction?120 The Supreme Court has failed to guide on the issue,121 and lower 
courts have taken different approaches. Some find specific jurisdiction on a 
“but for” basis: that the claim would not have arisen but for the defendant’s 
contact with the forum.122 Other courts are stricter, requiring “that the contacts 
must bear a direct relationship to the dispute.”123 Certainly, Mr. Nicastro’s inju-
ry would not have occurred but for the sale of the machines into Ohio. And the 
case presents the advantage, in Ohio, of involving direct sales and not the 
stream of commerce. It seems likely that the case might satisfy a stricter test 
too, but the conclusion is not free from doubt.124 
Before Goodyear and Daimler, such a close call for specific jurisdiction in 
Ohio would not have been litigated, because general jurisdiction was so clear. 
Without doubt, courts would have concluded that McIntyre engaged in “con-
tinuous and systematic” activities in Ohio by selling and marketing all of its 
products sold in North America to a single Ohio company. Had such litigation 
been pursued, it is likely that the McIntyre (like Goodyear USA in North Caro-
lina) would not have contested general jurisdiction. 
Today, however, it seems clear that Ohio could not exercise general juris-
diction. First, McIntyre is not “at home” in Ohio, because it is formed and has 
its headquarters in Great Britain. Second, Ohio will not qualify for activities-
based general jurisdiction, even though every machine McIntyre sold in North 
America was sold into Ohio. Because, as Goodyear established, general juris-
diction cannot be based upon sales into the forum. Third, an appeal to fairness 
factors will do no good. So notwithstanding that the plaintiff (injured in the 
United States) has an interest in suing in the United States, and notwithstanding 
that Ohio may have an interest in providing courtroom for an American plain-
tiff, general jurisdiction is not available. 
In the domestic context, Goodyear and Daimler may make litigation more 
difficult for plaintiffs. The citizen of North Carolina who is injured by an al-
leged defect in a Goodyear tire while on vacation in Florida can invoke specific 
jurisdiction in Florida or general jurisdiction in Ohio. Until the Court’s recent 
efforts, he could sue at home. Now he cannot, though it is not clear why juris-
diction would be onerous or unfair to Goodyear USA in a state in which it has a 
large and constant corporate presence. In the international context, though, the 
                                                        
120  In International Shoe, the Court spoke of contacts that “arise out of or are connected 
with” the dispute. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
121  HAY ET AL., supra note 26, at 361 (“Oddly enough, the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the question of what constitutes a related contact.”). 
122  Id. at 362. 
123  Id. at 362–63. 
124  “Justice Kennedy and Ginsburg’s opinion [in McIntyre] hint that jurisdiction might not 
be proper even in Ohio . . . .” Klerman, supra note 38, at 1563. 
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stakes are higher and the Court may have put American plaintiffs in a very dif-
ficult position. On the facts of McIntyre, we would like to assume that Ohio 
would exercise specific jurisdiction. Again, though, that is not a foregone con-
clusion. A negative answer—in combination with the new restrictions on gen-
eral jurisdiction—leaves American plaintiffs without access to American courts 
to vindicate claims arising in the United States. Why we would take that risk by 
limiting general jurisdiction in this era is a mystery. 
CONCLUSION 
In Goodyear and Daimler, the Court limits general jurisdiction without ex-
plaining why it is doing so. It adopts a new test—“at home”—that had abso-
lutely no currency in case law. Though it could have ruled in both cases on nar-
row grounds, the Court spoke broadly and decided issues that did not need to 
be decided. As a result, the Court has upset well-accepted notions of general 
jurisdiction based upon corporate activities. It neither explains nor justifies the 
new restrictions and seems unaware of the potential barriers they raise to access 
to justice. 
